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TREATY SHOPPING AND EXPANSIVE JURISDICTION: CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF
VENEZUELA’S DENUNCIATION OF THE ICSID CONVENTION
Kathryn E. Rimpfel*
INTRODUCTION

I.

The denunciation of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
between States and Nationals of Other States (“the ICSID Convention”) by Venezuela
poses many questions for, and undoubtedly has an impact on, the international investment
arbitration community.1 The January 24, 2012 denunciation by the Latin American oil
giant was the third in the history of the International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes (“ICSID”), preceded by Ecuador in 2009 and Bolivia in 2007. 2 This
recent string of departures, as well as a pattern of ICSID awards against Latin American
countries, has uncovered displeasure with ICSID and raised questions about the fairness
of the institution.3 Additionally, pending ICSID cases involving Ecuador, Bolivia, and
now Venezuela suggest that denunciation does little to address the institution’s decisions
toward Latin American countries.4 Instead, ICSID’s jurisdiction over investment disputes
remains in effect through an elaborate web of bilateral investment treaties, State-level
legislation, and investment instruments.5

*

Kathryn E. Rimpfel is an Associate Editor of the Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation and a 2014
Juris Doctor Candidate at The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law.
1
ICSID News Release, INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT INV. DISP. (Jan. 26, 2012),
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=OpenPage&PageType
=AnnouncementsFrame&FromPage=Announcements&pageName=Announcement100; Sergey Ripinsky,
Venezuela’s Withdrawal From ICSID: What it Does and Does Not Achieve, INV. TREATY NEWS (Apr. 13,
2012), http://www.iisd.org/itn/2012/04/13/venezuelas-withdrawal-from-icsid-what-it-does-and-does-notachieve/.
2
Id.; ICSID News Release, INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT INV. DISP. (July 9, 2009),
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=OpenPage&PageType
=AnnouncementsFrame&FromPage=NewsReleases&pageName=Announcement20; ICSID News Release,
INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT INV. DISP. (May 16, 2007),
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=OpenPage&PageType
=AnnouncementsFrame&FromPage=NewsReleases&pageName=Announcement3.
3
See Katia Fach Gómez, Latin America and ICSID: David Versus Goliath?, 17 L. & BUS. REV. AM.
195, 197 (2011) (setting forth several sources of displeasure with ICSID, such as the fear that hostility
toward ICSID may hamper access to World Bank credit, pressure to hire expensive law firms to navigate
the system, a lack of transparency by arbitration panels, the absence of an appeals process and limited
annulment procedure, and failure of tribunals to incorporate economic downturns, health, and
environmental interests into their decisions).
4
ICSID Case Database, INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT INV. DISP.,
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet (last visited Oct. 13, 2012) (follow “cases” and then “search
cases,” narrow search to “Ecuador,” “Bolivia,” or “Venezuela”) (Bolivia has two pending ICSID cases,
Ecuador has three, and Venezuela has twenty).
5
Christoph Schreuer, Commentary on the ICSID Convention, 11 ICSID REV. 318, 423 (1996)
[hereinafter “Commentary”].
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While ICSID tribunals hear claims from across the world, the institution’s
caseload has been disproportionately concentrated in Latin America.6 South and Central
American States have been the source of 36% of ICSID’s cases over the institution’s 46year history, with Venezuela and Argentina making up the bulk of that percentage.7 Much,
if not all of this activity arose in the past two decades as the region began to integrate into
the global economy.8 The region was slow to join the trend of bilateral investment treaties
(“BITs”) that serve as the overwhelming basis of ICSID’s jurisdiction, and many South
and Central American countries did not become signatories to the ICSID Convention
until the 1990s.9 With the entrance of these countries came a subsequent rise in ICSID
arbitration activity. While only 38 cases were registered by ICSID in the first 25 years of
its history, 344 cases have been filed between 1997 and 2012.10
This delayed integration into international institutions such as ICSID can be
attributed to the prevailing school of thought in much of Latin America concerning
international relations: The Calvo Doctrine. This doctrine, set forth by Argentine legal
scholar Carlos Calvo, maintained that foreign aliens should be subject to the laws of the
nation in which they do business, and that the jurisdiction for an investment dispute lies
in the country where the investment was made.11 This theory runs contrary to the very
purpose of ICSID, which was formed to limit diplomatic protection in cases of investor6

See Mary Helen Mourra, The Conflicts and Controversies in Latin American Treaty-Based Disputes,
in LATIN AMERICAN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION: THE CONTROVERSIES AND CONFLICTS 5-10, 1517 (Thomas E. Carbonneau ed. 2008) (detailing the proliferation of claims against Latin American
countries on the ICSID caseload prior to 2007).
7
The ICSID Caseload – Statistics, p. 11, Chart 6 (Issue 2012-2)
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ShowDocument&
CaseLoadStatistics=True&language=English32 [hereinafter “ICSID Caseload 2012-2”]; see Ibironke T.
Odumosu, The Antinomies of the (Continued) Relevance of ICSID to the Third World, 8 SAN DIEGO INT’L
L.J. 345, 348, 358 (2007) (explaining that the majority of state defendants in ICSID cases are Third World
countries and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) states, and positing that
“their economies and populations are more vulnerable to the negative effects of foreign investment” and
“the state of their economies dictate the necessity for some level of government intervention in foreign
investment”).
8
See ICSID Caseload 2012-2, supra note 7, at 11, Chart 6.
9
See Alejandro A. Escobar, Introductory Note on Bilateral Investment Treaties Recently Concluded by
Latin American States, 11 ICSID REV. 86, 87 (1996); List of Contracting States and Other Signatories of
the Convention, INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT INV. DISP. (July 25, 2012)
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ShowDocument&
language=English; Mourra, supra note 6, at 15-17 (explaining that lending policies of world financial
institutions influence the liberalization of investment policies that, in turn, increased Latin American
adoption of BITs. In addition, the Latin American Debt Crisis of the 1980s made adherence to these
economic policies a necessity).
10
ICSID Caseload 2012-2 supra note 7, at 7, Chart 1.
11
Bernardo M. Cremades, Resurgence of the Calvo Doctrine in Latin America, 7 BUS. L. INT’L 53, 5556 (2006); James Thuo Gathii, War’s Legacy in International Investment Law, 11 INT’L COMMUNITY L.
REV. 353, 355, 362-363 (2009) (Explaining that the Calvo Doctrine, as well as the subsequent Drago
Doctrine, served as efforts against economic inequality between powerful European nations and weaker
Latin American nations that became apparent during nineteenth century military interventions to collect the
debts of nationals. The Doctrine maintained that foreign investors do not have a separate, universal
standard of justice or access to diplomatic protection by their native country, but are instead subject to the
laws of the particular jurisdiction and have the same remedies as domestic investors); Mourra, supra note 6,
at 8 (describing the Calvo Doctrine as “a very classic, state-centric view of international law, based on an
absolutist view of state sovereignty and equality of the states”).
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state disputes by giving investors international standing and a course of redress outside of
national courts.12 Championed as a neutral facility that encouraged investment by
assuring a fair forum for disputes,13 ICSID was not accepted by much of Latin America
until the 1990s, when the region experienced a liberalization of trade and investment.14
The departures by Bolivia, Ecuador and now Venezuela reflect a return to the
Calvo Doctrine, as all three countries cited ICSID’s infringement on national sovereignty
and right to regulate investment as the reason for their departure.15 Nicaragua has also
reportedly threatened departure through its Attorney General, 16 and proposed legislation
in Argentina calls for the same.17 Similarly, Venezuela declared that subjecting contracts
of public interest to any jurisdiction other than national courts would be a violation of the
1999 Venezuelan Constitution.18 While this constitutional conflict is certainly Venezuela’s
legal explanation for denunciation, the Nation’s recent history with the institution and
interactions with industry investors provide depth to the understanding of the country’s
break with ICSID.
II. EXPANSIVE JURISDICTION: CAUSE FOR DENUNCIATION?
Former Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez’s international demeanor made the
decision to denounce the ICSID convention somewhat expected, and the transition of

12

Schreuer, supra note 5, at 324; Tai-Heng Cheng, Power, Authority and International Investment
Law, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 464, 470-71 (2005) (“Although some states claim to exert great authority
over foreign investments, multinational corporations and capital-exporting states have secured greater
investment protections over time . . . Arbitral tribunals and international courts have usually been
custodians of international investment norms . . . National courts have often deployed their enforcement
authority to support decisions by international tribunals”).
13
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States,
Preamble, Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter “ICSID Convention”]; Report of the Executive
Directors of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of
Other States, ¶¶ 9-13 (March 18, 1965) [hereinafter “Report of the Executive Directors”]; Odumosu, supra
note 7, at 346 (“In the face of unclear rules, and against the backdrop of the need to protect foreign
investment through the internationalization of investment dispute settlement, and the position that this will
facilitate investment flows to Third World States, the World Bank established the International Centre for
the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)”).
14
See Alejandro A. Escobar, Introductory Note on Bilateral Investment Treaties Recently Concluded
by Latin American States, 11 ICSID REV. 86, 87 (1996).
15
See Gomez, supra note 3, at 209-10 (explaining that both Ecuador and Bolivia had Constitutional
provisions that prohibit them from signing international treaties or instruments that would subject the
nations to international arbitration).
16
See id. at 209.
17
1311-D-2012, Mar. 21, 2012 (Arg.) (proposed legislation by National Deputy for the City of Buenos
Aires Fernando Ezequiel Solanas calling for the repeal of Law 24 353, in which the country adopted the
ICSID convention; The bill criticizes the Bilateral Investment Treaties signed during the administration of
former President Carlos Menem, as well as ICSID’s infringement on national sovereignty through
diversion of claims away from national courts and the lack of an appeals process) available at
http://www.hcdn.gov.ar/proyectos/proyecto.jsp?id=134892.
18
Venezuela Formalizes its Withdraw from World Bank’s ICSID, EMBASSY OF VENEZ. (Jan. 25, 2012)
http://venezuela-us.org/2012/01/25/venezuela-formalizes-its-withdrawal-from-world-bank%E2%80%99sicsid/#more-22034; Mourra, supra note 6, at 20.
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power in the wake of his death will determine the permanency of the departure.19 Aside
from Venezuela’s diplomatic history, the Latin American nation’s experience before
ICSID tribunals is telling of its larger struggle with international investment arbitration.
At the time of Venezuela’s denunciation, there were approximately 20 cases pending
against the nation, half of which had been filed in the previous year.20 Venezuela
attempted to stem this tide of claims by challenging the facility’s authority over the cases,
yet ICSID tribunals denied these objections in five out of the six jurisdictional decisions
they handed down.21 Aside from these ICSID decisions, Venezuela faces recent
International Chamber of Commerce awards of $66.8 million and $908 million to
ConocoPhillips and Exxon Mobil, respectively.22 These awards in favor of foreign
investors arise either out of the same events or the same nucleus of facts that spurred the
same companies to bring claims before ICSID tribunals in 2007.23 The enormity of these
debts, as well as the long line of investors waiting in the wings for their time to bring
Venezuela before ICSID tribunals, is certainly a motivating factor in the denunciation.
Chavez described this predicament himself by calling the monetary claims and requests
by Exxon “impossible,” and announced that Venezuela would pay only $255 million of
the $908 million originally awarded to the company.24
The general claim of infringement on national sovereignty advanced by Bolivia,
Ecuador, and now Venezuela relates in part to the substantive outcomes of the cases, but
deals much more with the procedural structures of ICSID. The nature of the tribunal
system set forth in the ICSID Convention has a tendency to subject nations like
19

See Parisa Hafezi, Iran, Venezuela in “Axis of Unity” Against U.S. REUTERS, (July 2, 2007, 1:32pm
EDT), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/07/02/us-iran-venezuelaidUSDAH23660020070702 (quoting Chavez as saying, “The two countries will united to defeat the
imperialism of North America”); Nathan Crooks and Jose Orozco, Chavez Says Venezuela Won’t Accept
World Bank Arbitration, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Jan. 9, 2012, 9:34pm ET)
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-08/venezuela-won-t-accept-icsid-verdict-on-exxon-chavezsays.html (reporting that Chavez refused to accept any ICSID rulings, and that Chavez had threatened to
withdraw from ICSID as early as 2007); Juan Forero, In Upcoming Venezuelan Vote, Hugo Chavez Looms
Large, NAT’L PUBLIC RADIO (March 12, 2013, 3:58am) http://www.npr.org/2013/03/12/174057927/inupcoming-venezuelan-vote-hugo-chavez-looms-large.
20
ICSID Case Database, INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT INV. DISP.,
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet (last visited Oct. 13, 2012) (follow “cases” and then “search
cases,” narrow search to “Venezuela”).
21
Fedax N.V. v. The Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/3, Decision of the Tribunal on
Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 45 (July 11, 1997), 5 ICSID Rep. 186 (2002); Autopista Concesionada de
Venezuela, C.A. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/5, Decision on
Jurisdiction, ¶ 144 (September 27, 2001), 16 ICSID Rev. 419 (2004); Vannessa Ventures Ltd. v. The
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/6, Decision on Jurisdiction (Aug. 22,
2008); Mobil Corporation and others v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/27,
Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 209 (June 10, 2010); Cemex Caracas Investments B.V. and Cemex Caracas II
Investments B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/15, Decision on
Jurisdiction, ¶ 160 (Dec. 30, 2010); Brandes Investment Partners LP v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,
ICSID Case No. ARB/08/3, Award, ¶ 121 (Aug. 2, 2011).
22
Alison Sider, ConocoPhillips Awarded $66.8 Million in Venezuela Case, THE WALL STREET
JOURNAL (Sept. 21, 2012, 6:51 pm ET)
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444165804578010702582544458.html.
23
Id.
24
Nathan Crooks & Jose Orozco, Chavez Says Venezuela Won’t Accept World Bank Arbitration,
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Jan. 9, 2012, 9:34pm ET) http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-08/venezuelawon-t-accept-icsid-verdict-on-exxon-chavez-says.html.
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Venezuela to ICSID authority through either expansive or unclear definitions of
investments and nationality.25 The ambiguity of these factors, as well as the multiple
methods of obtaining State consent to ICSID jurisdiction, make the system easily
manipulable by claimants seeking access to ICSID tribunals.26 As a result, it is arguable
that many parties are gaining ICSID jurisdiction over disputes that the respondent-nations
did not intend to be within the scope of their consent to ICSID jurisdiction, and would
have otherwise been subject to local courts of the nation in dispute.27
A.

Establishing ICSID Jurisdiction

Article 25 of the ICSID Convention sets forth the facility’s scope of jurisdiction.28
As with the American conception of jurisdiction, the Convention’s parameters establishes
both a subject matter requirement and a personal requirement – commonly known as
ratione materiae and ratione personae.29 In the substantive aspect, the claim must be a
“legal dispute arising directly out of an investment,” although the Convention does not go
on to define the framer’s intent in the use of “legal dispute” or “investment.”30 Because
these definitions are essentially left to the agreement or disagreement of the parties, a
body of case law has developed to fill this void, especially when countries seek to contest
the legitimacy of an investment within the host State.31

25

See Maurice Mendelson, Issues Relating to the Identity of the Investor, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION: THE FORDHAM PAPERS 2010 23 (Arthur W. Rovine, ed.
2010) (“...the Washington Convention is . . . rather too unsophisticated to provide clear answers to the
many issues that arise in relation to the identity of the investor”); but see W. Michael Reisman and Anna
Vinnik, What Constitutes an Investment and Who Decides? in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION: THE FORDHAM PAPERS 2010 53 (Arthur W. Rovine, ed. 2010) (positing
that, in the wake of ICSID tribunal interpretations of the meaning of “investment,” post-Fedax investors
could be deprived of ICSID jurisdiction even if the transaction in question qualified as an investment under
the BIT).
26
See id.; see also infra notes 54-66 and accompanying text.
27
See id.
28
ICSID Convention, supra note 13, at art. 25(1) (“The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any
legal dispute arising directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State (or any constituent
subdivision or agency of a Contracting State designated to the Centre by that State) and a national of
another Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to the Centre. When
Parties have given their consent, no party may withdraw its consent unilaterally”).
29
Schreuer, supra note 5, at 324; Brigitte Stern, The Scope of Investor’s Protection under the
ICSID/BIT Mechanism: Recent Trends, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND
MEDIATION: THE FORDHAM PAPERS 2010 (Arthur W. Rovine, ed. 2010); Odumosu, supra note 7, at 351.
30
See Report of the Executive Directors, supra note 13, at ¶¶ 26-27 (shedding light on the meaning of
“legal dispute” by stating that mere conflicts of interest are not within the jurisdiction of the Centre, yet
admitting “no attempt was made to define the term ‘investment’”); Schreuer, supra note 5, at 325.
31
See Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No.
ARB/00/4 (Decision on Jurisdiction) (July 23, 2001); Emmanuel Gaillard & Yas Banifatemi, Introductory
Note to ICSID: Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco (Proceeding on
Jurisdiction) 42 I.L.M. 606 (2003) (explaining that Salini established a four-part test to define investments
that required the “existence of contributions, a certain duration in the performance of the contract, and
participation in the risks of the transaction,” and that the “transaction contribute to the economic
development of the host State.”).
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The personal element of ICSID jurisdiction requires that the parties be a
“Contracting State” and a “national of another Contracting State.”32 The intent of this
provision is that the investor is not a national of the host State, limiting jurisdiction to
truly international issues that deserve standing before ICSID, rather than a local court. 33
This standard finds its roots in the original purpose of the facility, which was to alleviate
the ills of diplomatic protectionism over investment disputes by giving the individual
investor standing to bring claims without implicating the resources or international
relations of the investor’s home country.34 As will be discussed, this element has become
increasingly difficult to establish given the rise in complex corporate structures that
implicate the laws of several countries.35
Parties must also consent, in writing, to the submission of the claim to ICSID.36
One of the strong features of ICSID as a legitimate international forum is its requirement
that, once consent has been given under Article 25, “no party may withdraw its consent
unilaterally.”37 This requirement primarily binds nations, who usually serve as
respondents, although the structure of the Convention allows both States and investors to
file claims with ICSID.38
B. Obtaining Consent
Consent to ICSID jurisdiction, as with nationality requirements, must be
established at the time of the institution of the proceedings. 39 Despite the simplicity of
this requirement, consent to ICSID jurisdiction does not have to be expressed in a single
instrument, and can instead be pieced together through various instruments or actions of
the investor and the State and perfected well in advance of conflict or filing of claims.40
Aside from individual investment contracts between the investor and State that explicitly
provide that disputes will be submitted to ICSID, the primary methods of obtaining
consent function like a unilateral contract.41 For example, in an effort to attract and
promote a secure environment for investment, host States often establish their consent to
32

ICSID Convention, supra note 13, at art. 25(1).
Anthony C. Sinclair, ICSID’s Nationality Requirements, 23 ICSID REV. 57, 60 (2008).
34
Sinclair, supra note 33, at 58; Odumosu, supra note 7, at 353 (“Prior to this time [drafting of the
ICSID Convention], foreign investment protection was assured through the instrumentality of merging the
legal systems of the colonized and the colonizer and where this failed, . . . through gunboat diplomacy”).
35
See infra notes 55-60.
36
Sinclair, supra note 33, at 58.
37
Id.
38
Report of the Executive Directors, supra note 13, at 41 (“While the broad objective of the
Convention is to encourage a larger flow of private international investment, the provisions of the
Convention maintain a careful balance between the interest of investors and those of host States. Moreover,
the Convention permits the institution of proceedings by host States as well as by investors and the
Executive Directors have constantly had in mind that the provisions of the Convention should be equally
adapted to the requirements of both cases”).
39
See Schreuer, supra note 5, at 437.
40
Report of the Executive Directors, supra note 13, at 43.
41
Christoph Schreuer, Denunciation of the ICSID Convention and Consent to Arbitration, in THE
BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 353-368, 358 (Waibel et al. eds., 2010) (“The exact terms
of consent are determined by the combination of offer and acceptance. The investor’s acceptance of
consent can be given only within the limits of the offer”).
33
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ICSID jurisdiction for disputes arising out of certain defined categories of investments
either through national legislation or bilateral investment treaties.42 These
pronouncements of consent, although occasionally equivocal or ambiguous, serve as an
offer to potential investors to take advantage of the legislation or treaty and begin projects
in the host State.
Aside from the reciprocal act of making the desired investment, investors must
take some affirmative actions to express acceptance of the offer to subject disputes to
ICSID. This could come in the form of applying for an investment license under national
legislation, or simply communicating to the State that the investor is making the
investment with the understanding that any disputes that may arise would be subject to
ICSID jurisdiction.43 Although unwise,44 consent or acceptance of the offer can be
expressed at the time of the claim’s initiation, allowing an investor to give its requisite
consent and accept the State’s offer of ICSID jurisdiction by filing a claim with ICSID.45
Once the investor acts upon the consent of the host State and perfects its own consent,
ICSID’s rule of irrevocability can be put into effect and parties are bound to ICSID
jurisdiction if other requisite elements are met.46
C. The Role of Bilateral Investment Treaties – “Treaty Shopping”
The nature and prevalence of BITs have made these documents valuable tools in
the search for consent to ICSID jurisdiction. These treaties have been formed between
States since 1959, when the first was signed between Germany and Pakistan in order to
promote non-discriminatory treatment of nationals from the other state and provide for
protection in the case of expropriation.47 These treaties gained heightened significance as
vehicles for obtaining consent to arbitration when ICSID was formed in 1965, yet many
treaties failed to provide requisite consent because they merely referred to the possibility
of resort to ICSID.48 After ICSID’s release of Model Clauses Relating to the Convention

42

See Schreuer, supra note 5, at 423, 429; Schreuer, supra note 41, at 357 (“Consent through BITs has
become accepted practice and is nowadays the basis for jurisdiction in the majority of cases administered
by ICSID. This phenomenon has been called arbitration without privity”); Odumosu, supra note 7, at 349.
43
Schreuer, supra note 5, at 429, 437-38.
44
Schreuer, supra note 41, at 363 (“Therefore, it is inadvisable for an investor to rely on an ICSID
consent clause contained in the host state’s domestic law or in a treaty without making a reciprocal
declaration of consent. The investor may wait with its acceptance of the offer of consent until it institutes
proceedings before the Centre. But in doing so it runs the risk that the offer may be withdrawn before
then”).
45
Schreuer, supra note 5, at 437-38; David A. Pawlak and José Antonio Rivas, Managing InvestmentTreaty Obligations and Investor-State Disputes: A Guide for Government Officials, in LATIN AMERICAN
INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION: THE CONTROVERSIES AND CONFLICTS 171 (Thomas E. Carbonneau,
ed. 2008).
46
Schreuer, supra note 5, at 457.
47
Antonio R. Parra, Remarks, ICSID and the Rise of Bilateral Investment Treaties: Will ICSID be the
Leading Arbitration Institution in the Early 21 st Century? AM. SOC’Y INT’L L., PROCEEDINGS OF THE
ANNUAL MEETING 41 (Charles N. Bower, ed. 2000); Gary Born, A New Generation of International
Adjudication, 61 DUKE L.J. 775, 832 (2012).
48
Id.
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on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Designed for Bilateral Investment Treaties,
BITs began to increasingly hit their desired target.49
A drastic increase in the number of BITs between the 1970s and the 1990s was
attributed to the adoption of the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, which allowed ICSID
tribunals to hear claims when one of the parties was not a signatory to the ICSID
convention.50 This enhanced utility allowed ICSID to evolve into the predominate forum
for investment disputes, thus encouraging the development of the approximately 1,4001,800 BITs estimated to be in effect as of 2000, and over 2,600 by 2010.51 The substance
of these treaties varies widely in their conditions on consent to ICSID jurisdiction, as well
as inclusion of “most favoured nation” clauses, definitions of investments, and definitions
of nationality.52 This is made abundantly clear through the practice of treaty shopping, or
strategic incorporation to gain a certain nationality for the purposes of protection under
that nation’s treaties.53
Venezuelan arbitration cases have exposed the differences between bilateral
investment treaties, with Dutch treaties rising to the top of legal instruments used to
initiate ICSID claims. Dutch treaties have been identified as notorious tools for bringing
suits against host States due to provisions that make the grant of standing and jurisdiction
extremely likely.54 Gaining access to these useful treaties has become relatively easy,
with an estimated 20,000 “mailbox” or “shell” companies claiming Dutch nationality
despite a lack of operational or commercial activity in the nation.55 Other commercial and
tax benefits can be credited for this phenomenon, although strategic nationality planning
for the purposes of international investment is growing due to the approximately 95
bilateral investment treaties executed by the Netherlands with countries across the
world.56
Through this practice, investors with an unfortunate nationality, i.e. of a country
without a BIT with the nation in which the investment is made, or of a country with a
restrictive BIT that would not cover its investment or injury, can gain a more favorable
nationality through corporate restructuring.57 This restructuring begins with the creation
of a corporate entity under the laws of a favorable country, and then having that new
entity make the investment directly or fund the investment indirectly through the preexisting corporation that had insufficient nationality for ICSID jurisdiction.58 This
49

Id.; Schreuer, supra note 41, at 359.
Parra, supra note 47, at 42.
51
Id; Gary Born, A New Generation of International Adjudication, 61 DUKE L.J. 775, 833 (2012).
52
Mourra, supra note 6, at 17 (“BITs, while differing from one another, generally contain...”
definitions of investments, a national treatment provision, a most-favoured nation (MFN) clause, and a
dispute resolution clause, among other provisions).
53
ROOS VAN OS & ROELINE KNOTTNERUS, DUTCH BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: A GATEWAY TO
“TREATY SHOPPING” FOR INVESTMENT PROTECTION BY MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES 4, 9 (Center for
Research on Multinational Corporations 2011) [hereinafter “Gateway to Treaty Shopping”].
54
Id. at 1; Diana Marie Wick, The Counter Productivity of ICSID Denunciation and Proposals for
Change 11 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 239, 265 (2012).
55
Gateway to Treaty Shopping, supra note 53, at 10. Rimantas Daujotas, Jurisdiction Ratione
Personae and Corporate Nationality in International Investment Arbitration – Legitimate Corporate
Planning or Abuse of Right? 7 INT’L ECON. L. EJOURNAL 1, 3 (2011) [hereinafter “Daujotas”].
56
Gateway to Treaty Shopping, supra note 53, at 10.
57
Id. at 9.
58
Id.; See also infra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
50
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restructuring can be done before or after the investment has been made, although the later
makes such restructuring more suspect in light of impending arbitration or litigation.59
The impact of treaty shopping implicates the underlying concern of nations about
their control over foreign investment, particularly amongst Latin American countries
guided by the previously addressed national economic interests and Calvo-inspired views
toward international law.60 While strategic nation planning may appear to be
inconsequential in light of ICSID’s over-arching purpose of increasing direct foreign
investment, it can be argued that such practices can allow corporations to evade local
regulations and attempts to promote sustainable development, and even gain entry when
their previous nationality would have been grounds for denial.61 When implemented after
the point of investment, this ability to restructure means that a state-respondent could be
confronted with ICSID arbitration with a now-Dutch investor, who, at the time of the
formation of a service contract or approval of an investment license, was previously
controlled by a corporation of a nationality that would not implicate ICSID.62 Thus, even
when a country seeks to control and manage the extent of its exposure to ICSID liability,
restructuring can negate any such certainty.
Due to this jurisdictional disadvantage, one must question whether ICSID is truly
a mutually beneficial forum, as emphasized at its founding.63 Consent has transformed
from a proximate agreement to a more indirect method that gives investors more
flexibility and nations less certainty.64 While consent was championed as the cornerstone
59
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for ICSID jurisdiction,65 signatories seem to be subject to an ‘all or nothing’ form of
consent. Even if countries like Venezuela pick and choose which international partners to
enter into bilateral investment treaties with, or which investments and investors to allow
into their countries, those investors outside of that narrowly drawn scope of expected
jurisdiction can alter their nationality to fall within it. This is best exemplified by the
recent ICSID claims against Venezuela by Mobil and CEMEX.
1.

Mobil and Others v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela

As mentioned previously, the dispute between Mobil and Venezuela over the
company’s participation in the nation’s oil industry spans at least two international
arbitral forums and has already produced a substantial award in favor of Mobil.66 The
Mobil Corporation initiated ICSID arbitration against Venezuela in 2007 following the
nationalization of the oil industry after a period of privatization.67 Mobil’s oil ventures in
Venezuela began in the mid 1990s, when the country used a wide interpretation of its
1975 Nationalization Law to allow companies like Mobil to participate in the production
and upgrading of extra-heavy crude oil.68 This was followed by a period of increased
regulation of the industry between 2001 and 2007, including mandatory “migration” of
previously formed agreements into mixed companies, as well as increases in royalty
rates, extraction taxes, and income taxes.69 This period ended with a decree ordering all
companies that had not complied with the mandatory migration to a mixed status to be
nationalized.70
The Mobil Corporation initiated arbitration under the Netherlands-Venezuela BIT
as well as the Venezuelan Investment Law.71 Venezuela contested the standing of the
parties under the given BIT due to Mobil’s complex corporate structure, which resulted in
six different claimants: three Delaware companies, two Bahamanian companies, and one
Dutch company.72 In October 2005, during the course of Mobil’s interaction with
Venezuela over the mandated corporate migration, Mobil created a new corporate entity
under the laws of the Netherlands, and the new corporate structure was as follows:
21. As the result of this restructuring, Mobil (Delaware) owns 100% of
Venezuela Holdings (Netherlands), which owns 100% of Mobil CN
Holding (Delaware), which owns 100% of Mobil CN (Bahamas), which
finally owns a 41 2/3% interest in the Cerro Negro Association.
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22. Venezuela Holdings (Netherlands) also owns 100% of Mobil
Venezolana Holdings (Delaware), which owns 100% of Mobil Venezolana
(Bahamas), which finally owns a 50% interest in the La Ceiba
Association.73
Venezuela contended that the named claimants were not the true owners or
controllers of the investments in Venezuela, did not qualify as international investors, and
did not have standing under the Netherlands-Venezuela BIT.74 Because the restructuring
occurred after the investment was already made and in the midst of an ongoing dispute,
Venezuela alleged that Mobil’s corporate restructuring was made in bad faith, and thus
should not give it standing under the Netherlands-Venezuela BIT.75 As summarized by
the Tribunal:
It submits that Venezuela Holdings is a ‘corporation of convenience’
created in anticipation of litigation against the Republic of Venezuela for
the sole purpose of gaining access to ICSID jurisdiction. It concludes that
‘this abuse of the corporate form and blatant treaty-shopping should not be
condoned.’76
Furthermore, Venezuela claimed that the Delaware and Bahamas corporations listed as
claimants do not have standing under the Dutch treaty through their relation to and the
existence of the Dutch corporation.77
The claimants responded to this allegation by asserting that the creation of the
Dutch entity was in the course of ongoing and new investments and projects, and was
thus not intended to “position” the claimants for arbitration or litigation. 78 Mobil argued
that there is no legal basis for piercing the corporate veil or imposing nationality
requirements not enumerated in the BIT.79 After agreeing with Venezuela that the
Investment Law did not give the requisite consent to ICSID arbitration due to ambiguous
intent and language,80 the tribunal nonetheless granted jurisdiction under the NetherlandsVenezuela BIT and rejected Venezuela’s claims of insufficient nationality, the absence of
a direct investment, and abuse of the corporate form.
The tribunal’s analysis revealed the unusual benefits of the Dutch-Venezuela BIT,
which defines a “national” as:
(i) national persons having the nationality of that Contracting Party;
(ii) legal persons constituted under the law of that Contracting Party;
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(iii) legal persons not constituted under the law of that Contracting Party,
but controlled, directly or indirectly, by natural persons as defined in (i) or
by legal persons as defined in (ii) above.81
Venezuela contended that this definition of nationality was at odds with the limits on
jurisdiction provided by the ICSID Convention, which Venezuela interpreted to exclude a
control test like the one contained in part (iii) of the BIT.82 The Tribunal rejected this
argument, holding that the Convention’s language does not impose any particular criteria
for nationality – control or otherwise – on juridical persons that do not have the same
nationality as the host state.83 Thus, the Tribunal allowed the implementation of the
“control test” under section (iii) of the BIT, constituting the first time an ICSID tribunal
has endorsed a determination of nationality on a basis other than the company’s seat or
place of incorporation.84
The expansiveness of this definition of nationality is made clear by the Protocol
of the Netherlands-Venezuela BIT raised by the Tribunal. The Protocol provides that
“control,” and thus standing under the treaty, exists when the party is either (a) an affiliate
of, (b) economically subordinate to, or is (c) owned by a sufficient percentage by a legal
person constituted in the territory of the other Contracting Party, making it possible for
them to exercise control.85 The Tribunal utilized part (c) of the Protocol provision to hold
that, because the Dutch holdings company had 100% ownership over the two American
subsidiaries, it had the ability to control them, even if that control was not utilized.86 The
Tribunal held that, even though the Dutch holdings company merely passed capital to its
subsidiaries, this indirect investment should not bar it from ICSID standing, citing the
broad definition of “investment” in the BIT:
a. The term “investment” shall comprise every kind of asset and more
particularly though not exclusively:
(i) movable and immovable property, as well as any other rights in rem in
respect of every kind of assets;
(ii) rights derived from shares, bonds, and other kinds of interest in
companies and joint ventures;
(iii) title to money, to other assets as to any performance having an
economic value;
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(iv) rights in the field of intellectual property, technical processes,
goodwill and know-how;
(v) rights granted under public law, including rights to prospect, explore,
extract and win natural resources.87
Because section (a) encompasses “every kind of assets” and did not require the absence
of intermediary companies between the investor and the investment, the Tribunal found
that the Dutch company had satisfied this aspect of the BIT.88
The Tribunal addressed Venezuela’s claim of abuse of the corporate form and
acknowledged that the restructuring of the investments’ corporate ownership was in
response to increased tax rates and in anticipation of litigation with Venezuela.89
However, the Tribunal found that this anticipatory restructuring was “legitimate corporate
planning” as maintained by Mobil, rather than an “abuse of right” as argued by
Venezuela.90 To make this distinction, the Tribunal evaluated the timing of the
investments, the timing of incorporation, and the timing of the dispute, and found that the
development of the Dutch company was well after the height of the investment, yet
before the issuance of the nationalization decree.91 As a result of this timing, the Tribunal
found that “this was a perfectly legitimate goal as far as it concerned future disputes.” 92
The Tribunal found that, even though it would be an abuse of right to establish a
corporation in a favorable jurisdiction after the dispute arose, this incorporation occurred
before the defined dispute – i.e. the nationalization of the projects in question.93
Therefore, even though the potential for a dispute was acknowledged and communicated
by the parties several years before ultimate nationalization, and even though the
incorporation of the Dutch company was an explicit effort to improve the legal
protections of the investment in anticipation of litigation, the Tribunal found that it did
not constitute an abuse of the corporate form.
Due to this ruling, expansive definitions of nationality and investment like that of
the Netherlands-Venezuela BIT have been validated as a method of gaining jurisdiction
when it would not have otherwise existed, exposing countries like Venezuela to liability
through ICSID when such disputes might have been handled elsewhere and under
different terms. The five named claimants within Mobil’s corporate structure that
received standing through the Dutch corporation were from the United States or the
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Bahamas, two states that do not have bilateral investment treaties with Venezuela.94 In
addition, even amongst the states Venezuela has executed bilateral investment treaties
with, there are clear advantages to the various components in the Dutch treaty as
compared to others, as alternative treaties do not normally have such lenient investment
and nationality provisions.95 This is further evidenced by the reappearance of the
Netherlands-Venezuela BIT in CEMEX v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.
2.

CEMEX v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela

Within the same year as the Mobil decision on jurisdiction, the Tribunal in
CEMEX v. Venezuela handed down a jurisdictional ruling against Venezuela in a case
that also arose out of the nationalization of an investment project, but in the cement
industry. Claimants CEMEX Caracas Investments B.V. and CEMEX Caracas II
Investments B.V. were companies incorporated under the laws of the Netherlands, and
brought the claim after Venezuela nationalized their cement production and forcibly
occupied CEMEX plants without compensation for the takings.96 Venezuela maintained
that this nationalization was part of a 2008 restructuring of major cement companies in
the country.97
The corporate structure of CEMEX and the related companies reflected the
structure detailed in Mobil: a hierarchy of subsidiaries formed in various countries. The
claimants sit in the middle of this chain:
[A] Mexican company, Cemex, S.A.B. de C.V. (“Cemex”) owns 100% of
Cemex Espana S.A., which owns 100% of one of the Claimants, a Dutch
company called Cemex Caracas. In turn, Cemex Caracas owns 100% of
one of the Claimants, another Dutch Company called Cemex Caracas II.
Cemex Caracas II owns 100% of Vencement Investments (“Vencement”) a
company incorporated in the Cayman Islands. Finally, as of 2002,
Vencement owns 75.7% of Cemex Venezuela (CemVen), the cement
company that was operating in the territory of the Respondent.98
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As in Mobil, the claimants in CEMEX brought their claims under the
Netherlands-Venezuela BIT, as well as the Venezuelan Investment Law.99 After an
extensive contextual analysis and investigation into the legislative history of the
Venezuelan Investment Law, the Tribunal held that it did not provide clear and
unambiguous consent to ICSID jurisdiction, and instead relied on the NetherlandsVenezuela BIT.100
As argued in Mobil, Venezuela maintained that the CEMEX investment in the
cement venture was indirect, rather than direct, placing CEMEX outside the scope of the
Netherlands-Venezuela BIT.101 In an argument informed by the outcome in Mobil,
Venezuela acknowledged that CEMEX and its Cayman Islands subsidiary Vencement
qualified as Dutch nationals under the BIT’s expansive definition of nationality and
investment.102 However, Venezuela argued that the treaty does not grant standing to a
national who did not personally make the investment in the territory of the Contracting
State involved in the claim.103 Venezuela maintained that, if reference to indirect
investment is not explicitly given, the treaty does not extend standing to that form of
investment.104 This narrow reading of the treaty would grant standing only to the party
that made the ultimate transfer of assets to the entity performing the investment within
the Contracting State that is party to the claim.105 Thus, Venezuela argued that the
appropriate claimants, subsidiaries CemVen and Vencement, were not included as parties,
depriving the claimants of the requisite standing to gain ICSID jurisdiction.106
The Tribunal analogized the Netherlands-Venezuela BIT definition of
“investment” to that of the Germany-Argentina BIT addressed in Siemens v. Argentina, a
case in which the Tribunal held that when there is broad drafting with non-exhaustive
examples of investments, absence of a distinction should not be considered a limiting
condition on standing under the provision.107 Thus, the Tribunal concluded that when the
provision does not acknowledge the possibility of intermediary companies between the
national-investor and the investment, it should serve as an allowance of such an
investment structure, not a prohibition on standing for indirect investments.108 As a result,
if the BIT covers indirect investments, it also grants protection to the indirect investor,
such as CEMEX and CEMEX II.109
This ruling reaffirmed the power of the Netherlands-Venezuela BIT. The broad
definition of nationality settled in Mobil validated the use of bilateral investment treaties
to give standing to entities controlled by nationals, thus going beyond the traditional
international law methods of determining nationality. CEMEX additionally provided that
bilateral investment treaties can be used to expand the definition of investments at the
99
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will of the parties, transforming investment arbitration jurisdiction from a uniform rule to
a private contract matter.
III. DENUNCIATION: APPROPRIATE MEANS TO THE DESIRED END?
Having established the procedural defects that spurred Venezuela’s denunciation
of the ICSID Convention, the question still left unanswered is whether the means will
actually accomplish the desired ends. As previously established, consent to ICSID
jurisdiction is not established by mere status as a signatory to the Convention, and can
instead be the product of a variety of legal instruments.110 This, in turn, means that
revocation of consent must address each of the potential sources of consent.
The ICSID Convention allows for denunciation, as well as a six-month grace
period for the denunciation to take effect.111 Uncertainty about the meaning of this sixmonth period led to questions about the claims that arise during and after the period.112
Thus, nine cases were rapidly filed against Venezuela in the first half of 2012.113
However, the rush to file claims might not have been necessary. Under Article 72 of the
Convention, notice of denunciation under Article 71 “shall not affect the rights or
obligations under this convention of that State . . . arising out of consent to the
jurisdiction of the Centre given by one of them before such notice was received by the
depositary.”114 Therefore, just as with establishing jurisdiction, the method for denying
jurisdiction is best analyzed by determining when consent was perfected. As evidenced
by the ongoing cases before ICSID tribunals by Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela,
denunciation has no effect on claims already in progress.115 Consent was either stipulated
or decided by the tribunal, and post-hoc denunciation has little bearing when the crucial
initiation time has already passed.
When analyzing the effective date of such revocation of consent, Article 72
modifies the six-month waiting period provided for in Article 71.116 The date of the
denunciation’s effect is not at the end of the six-month waiting period, but rather at the
time of receipt, and it is only the rights and obligations of the denouncing state that
remain in effect for the six-month period after receipt of the denunciation.117
Because unilateral revocation is prohibited once consent to ICSID jurisdiction is
procured, investors who have already availed themselves of an offer either through
national legislation or a bilateral investment treaty and have taken the appropriate steps to
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perfect consent would still have access to ICSID, despite Venezuela’s denunciation of the
ICSID convention.118 Even if a dispute has not yet arisen, if these aforementioned
requirements have been met to procure consent, those parties would be able to bring
claims that arise in the future.
In contrast, an offer of consent to ICSID jurisdiction in a bilateral investment
treaty that is not acted upon by the investor does not create any obligation for the State
under the ICSID Convention.119 However, these bilateral investment treaties still exist as
an offer for consent to jurisdiction, and are valid if acted upon by the investor despite the
denunciation of the ICSID convention, and as a result, the consent would arise out of the
bilateral investment treaty alone, rather than under the ICSID Convention.120
Expansive instruments like the Netherlands-Venezuela BIT further exemplify the
resilient, binding nature of bilateral investment treaties in the face of ICSID denunciation.
First, Article 9, paragraph 2 of the treaty provides for submission of disputes arising
under the treaty to ICSID under the Additional Facility Rules “as long as the Republic of
Venezuela has not become a Contracting State of the Convention.”121 Thus, even in light
of denunciation, the treaty binds Venezuela to ICSID jurisdiction, although under a
different set of rules. Second, model Dutch treaties have a standard duration of 15 years,
and parties to the treaty are prohibited from one-sided change or withdrawal from the
treaty.122 The Netherlands-Venezuela BIT has this restriction, as well as periods of 15
year renewals, meaning that Venezuela will have to wait until 2021 to amend its treaty
with the Netherlands.123
Due to the power of bilateral investment treaties to alter and enhance the
jurisdictional boundaries under the ICSID Convention, it is clear that States wishing to
cut ties with the facility must also address the instruments that give the Centre consent to
preside over the disputes. Denunciation does not relieve Venezuela of its current ICSID
cases, nor does it negate consent given in bilateral investment treaties, thus failing to
effectively stem the tide of future claims arising out of investments. Thus, despite the
drastic nature of denunciation, it appears that Venezuela is still subject to claims of
investors who have bought into favorable bilateral investment treaties that are still
binding on the State.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The system of international investment arbitration set forth by the International
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes advances a valuable and necessary
alternative to diplomatic protectionism for the resolution of investment disputes by giving
foreign investors standing on an international level. In this sense, the balance of the
institution’s history can be deemed a positive impact on international relations. However,
one must question whether increased treaty shopping has expanded the Centre’s
jurisdiction past a mutually beneficial scope.
With rulings like Mobil and CEMEX, ICSID tribunals have officially endorsed
the manipulation of jurisdictional standards through bilateral investment treaties, diluting
any coherent standard in favor of private contract law. While this contractual fluidity of
corporate identity can serve the original goal of the Centre by preventing diplomatic
protection, it places nations at a distinct disadvantage. Tribunal deference to bilateral
investment treaties has potentially expanded the jurisdiction of the Centre to match the
breadth of the definitions of investment and nationality posed in those treaties.
This web of connections created by bilateral investment treaties can be difficult to
retreat from once enacted, placing nations in the precarious position of either exiting
international agreements or being subject to an arbitral body that has stacked the deck
against them. Therefore, in the case of countries like Venezuela who have attracted a
substantial ICSID caseload, denunciation may serve as the first severed tie in an attempt
to free itself from ICSID’s jurisdictional web.
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